副署死结下的台湾宪政危机

2025 年 12 月中旬，台湾政坛之所以被称為「宪政危机」，关键不在单一政策争吵，而在制度运作卡死：立法院通过重大修法（多与财源分配／财政安排相关），行政院长卓荣泰却表态拒绝副署推动，使法律难以完成公布与施行，行政与立法因此正面对撞。

问题的根源是宪政结构的「双重门槛」：总统公布法律依法须经行政院长副署，一旦行政院长坚持不副署，就会出现「国会通过、行政不落地」的僵局，最后往往只能靠政治手段解套。

而这场僵局更棘手之处在於：原本应扮演仲裁者的宪法审查机制先前也因制度与人事因素备受争议；直到 12 月 19 日宪法法庭（114 年宪判字第 1 号）针对《宪诉法》部分修正作出违宪判决，才被视為试图让「裁判者」回到场上。

接下来能否降温，通常取决於三条路：朝野协商修正争议法案、立院是否走向不信任案（倒阁）等宪政出口、以及宪法法庭能否持续稳定运作并提供可被接受的裁判。

Taiwan’s Constitutional Crisis in Brief

In mid-December 2025, Taiwan’s political standoff began to be described as a “constitutional crisis” not because of a single policy dispute, but because a core part of constitutional machinery appeared to seize up. The legislature passed major legislation (widely discussed in connection with fiscal and central-local revenue arrangements), but Premier Cho Jung-tai signaled he would refuse to countersign and move it forward—creating a direct collision between the executive and the legislature.

The structural problem is a built-in “double lock”: the president’s promulgation of laws requires the premier’s countersignature. When the premier refuses, the system can end up with a law that has cleared parliament yet cannot be fully promulgated and implemented, producing a deadlock that is difficult to solve through ordinary administrative procedures.

The deadlock has been even harder to contain because Taiwan’s constitutional referee—the Constitutional Court—has itself been under strain. On December 19, 2025, the Court issued Judgment No. 1 of 2025  striking down parts of amendments to the Constitutional Court Procedure framework, widely seen as an attempt to restore the Court’s capacity to function as an effective arbiter.

From here, the crisis can cool only through a few realistic exits: political negotiation and revision of disputed provisions, escalation to constitutional “pressure valves” such as a no-confidence move, and—crucially—whether the Constitutional Court can operate steadily and deliver decisions that the political branches and the public accept as legitimate.