川普再提「必须拥有格林兰」：一场牵动北极战略、主权与盟友信任的风暴

2026年1月9日，美国总统川普在白宫公开表示，美国「必须」取得格林兰岛，并以吓阻俄罗斯与中国在北极的战略扩张作為核心理由；相关说法也再度把「买下格林兰」的旧议题推回国际舞台中央。 

一、為何格林兰突然成為「必争之地」？

格林兰的关键不是人口或市场，而是地理。它位於北美与欧洲之间的北大西洋与北极门户，对飞弹预警、太空监测与北约北翼防务具有长期战略意义。美国在格林兰早已有军事存在，依据的是1951年美国与丹麦签署、关於格林兰防务的协定架构（其后亦有补充与修订）。 

川普此次措辞更强硬之处，在於他不只谈「合作」，而是把「拥有」描述成长期安全的必要条件，并暗示更具压迫性的选项也在评估之中。

二、格林兰「属於谁」：不是一句话能改变的主权现实

格林兰是「丹麦王国」的一部分，但它同时是高度自治的政治体。丹麦政府官方对外说明指出，2009年《格林兰自治法》的序言承认格林兰人民在国际法下拥有自决权，并强调该法建立在格林兰政府与丹麦政府「平等伙伴」的协议基础上。 

这意味着：格林兰的未来走向，并非外部强权用「买卖」二字即可定夺，而必须面对丹麦宪政安排、格林兰自治制度与「人民意志」三重门槛。

三、从「买岛」到「付钱说服」：引爆欧洲盟友警戒

争议之所以升温，还在於外媒披露白宫内部曾讨论以「支付款项」等方式，试图影响格林兰民意与政治走向，甚至被视為推动其脱离丹麦、再与美方更紧密结合的工具。 

同时，路透也指出丹麦方面再度重申「格林兰不出售」，而美方高层（报导提及国务卿）亦将与丹麦领袖会面，使得此议题不再只是口水战，而是进入更敏感的外交互动。 

对欧洲而言，问题不只在格林兰，而在北约信任：若以威胁或单边压力处理盟友领土与自治体的前途，将直接冲击战后秩序与集体防卫的政治基础。

四、格林兰的声音：不愿被「代言」

在各方拉扯之际，格林兰自身也释放讯号。半岛电视台报导引述格林兰外交事务负责人表示，格林兰应在与美方的对话中「扮演主导角色」，并对与美方官员的会谈抱持期待。 

这句话的弦外之音很清楚：格林兰不愿只在丹麦与美国之间被动成為筹码，而要把「谁来谈、谈什麼、谈到哪裡」拉回到自己手上。

五、最可能的结局：不是「併吞」，而是「更深合作」与「更长博弈」

从制度与国际法理看，格林兰被「直接买走」几乎不具可行性；但在现实政治上，美国加强在格林兰的部署与合作、丹麦与北约提升北极防务整合、以及格林兰在自治与对外协议上的扩权讨论，反而更可能成為接下来的主轴。1951年防务协定的存在，早已提供「合作型安全」的法律路径；真正的争议，在於川普把路径推向「所有权式安全」，从而把盟友、主权与自决问题一次点燃。

Trump Renews Push for Greenland, Rekindling a High-Stakes Arctic Dispute

On January 9, 2026, President Donald Trump reignited controversy by arguing the United States “needs to own” Greenland, framing the issue as a national-security imperative tied to deterring Russia and China in the Arctic. In remarks at the White House, he suggested Washington should focus on defending “ownership” rather than “leases,” despite the long-standing U.S. military presence already on the island. 

The problem is that Greenland is not a piece of real estate waiting for a buyer. It is a self-governing territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, and Denmark’s own official description of Greenland’s status notes that the preamble to the 2009 Self-Government Act recognizes Greenlanders as a people with a right to self-determination under international law. In other words, the island’s future is inseparable from Greenland’s own political will and constitutional arrangements with Denmark. 

Strategically, the Arctic logic is real—but it cuts against the need for annexation. The United States already operates under a Cold War-era framework: the 1951 U.S.–Denmark agreement on the defense of Greenland provides the legal basis for American defense cooperation and military activities there. That existing pathway makes it possible to expand security cooperation without rewriting borders—precisely why Trump’s language about “taking” Greenland alarms European capitals. 

Allies moved quickly to tamp down the rhetoric. Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni publicly dismissed the prospect of any U.S. military move on Greenland and urged strengthening NATO’s Arctic posture instead—signaling that even friendly governments view coercive talk as dangerous for alliance unity. 

Ultimately, the Greenland dispute is less about whether the Arctic matters (it does) and more about how the West manages it: through strengthened NATO coordination and negotiated cooperation, or through unilateral claims that risk turning a strategic challenge into an alliance crisis